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NOTES AND COMMENT

Committee on Stock List of the New York Stock Exchange would
require before listing a preferred stock that the stock disclose just
what its preferences are in excess profits. To date the problem has
never arisen on the New York Stock Exchange and the views of the
members and traders of the Exchange cannot be ascertained.
The question may still be considered an open one.30 The Virginia court sums up the problem by saying:
"I do not think that either rule can be gathered from the
decisions of the courts as a maxim of the law applicable to all
cases. It may be that in some cases the failure to make any
provision as to participating in excess dividends would naturally be construed as granting such participation, while in
other cases the failure to make such provisions would be held
as a denial of participation. That question must be decided
in the light of all the language of the contract, giving effect to
every provision in it, and construing it in the light of the circumstances in which the parties stood." 3'
SAMUEL LEVINE.
ILLUSORY ASPECT OF CORPORATE CONTRACT TO REPURCHASE STOCK.

The New York Penal Law 1 declares, "A director of a stock
corporation who concurs in any vote or act of the directors of such
corporation, or any of them by which it is intended * * * 5. to apply
any portion of the funds of such corporation except surplus, directly
or indirectly to the purchase of shares of its own stock is guilty of a
misdemeanor". The Penal Law is naturally construed as permitting
a corporation to purchase its own shares from surplus.2 A majority
ferred were entitled to receive seven per cent cumulative dividends and the
common stock to receive annual dividends of seven per cent, any surplus to be
distributed pro rata to preferred and common. The question raised was whether

the common shareholders were entitled to cumulative dividends before the two

classes became entitled to participate equally. Held, that the contract does not
so provide, citing Englander v. Osborne, 261 Pa. 366, 104 Atl. 614 (1918).
But in Pennsylvania the rule had been laid down that the preferred stockholders
share with the common in excess profits in the absence of any provision negativing such intent. In Lockwood v. General Abrasive Co. the certificate of
incorporation expressly provided for such participation. The case merely holds,
therefore, that the preferred are entitled to all arrearages (being cumulative)
before the common get their annual dividend and then both classes share.
1 CooK, CORPORATIONS (6th ed.) § 269.
'Lyman v. Southern Ry., 149 Va. 274, 141 S. E. 240 (1928).
'PENAL LAW c. 40, § 664.
'Grasselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosive Co., 258 Fed. 66 (S.D. N. Y.
1918) ; In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; Richards
v. Weiner, 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y.

262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
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of the states do not insert this restriction and hold that a corporation
may purchase its own stock if there is no statutory or charter prohibition, and if done in good faith without injury to creditors, even though
no express statutory or charter authorization exists.3 The General
Corporation Law ' by stating that the "charter of every corporation
shall be subject to alteration, suspension and repeal in discretion of
the legislature" makes the Penal Law an integral part of every corporate charter, and charges contracting parties with notice of Penal
Statute. Because of the provision in the Penal Law-agreements effected by a corporation to repurchase its own stock at a future date
have been looked down upon by some New York courts and held as
not mutually binding and as lacking in consideration.5 On the other
hand, other New York courts 6 have held such contracts valid in their
inception.
In Topken, Loring and Schwartz v. Schwartz 7 -a controversial
New York case,-a contract was entered into between the corporation
and its employee, whereby upon the termination of his employment,
the employee was to sell his stock-holdings to the corporation. It was
held that the contract lacked mutuality of obligation." The corporation's promise was conditioned on its having a surplus on hand at the
end of the employment,-a surplus sufficient to pay the book-value, and
since the condition of that promise was within its control, its promise
was illusory and furnished no considerationfor the employee's promise.
What is the nature of an illusory promise? What is its effect
on repurchase agreements? The restatement 9 holds that a promise
which according to its terms leaves the condition to performance of
the promise wholly within the control of the promisor and makes
performance optional with him is, in fact, no promise although often
called an illusory promise. At another point the restatement sets
'Iowa Lumber Co. v. Foster, 49 Iowa 25, 31 Am. Rep. 140 (1878);
Barrett v. Webster Lumber Co., 275 Mass. 302, 175 N. E. 765 (1931) ; O'Brien
Mercantile Co. v. Bay Lake Fruit Growers, 178 Minn. 179, 226 N. W. 513
(1929); Cole v. Cole Realty Co., 169 Mich. 347, 135 N. W. 329 (1912); Davis
v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont. 500, 284 Pac. 267 (1930) ; Fremont
Carriage Co. v. Thomsen, 65 Neb. 370, 91 N. W. 376 (1902) ; Wolf v. Excelsior
Automatic Scale Co., 270 Pa. 547, 113 Atl. 569 (1921) ; Kennerly v. Columbia
Chemical Corp., 137 Va. 240, 119 S. E. 265 (1923); Gelchrist v. Highfield, 140
Wis. 476, 123 N. W. 102 (1909).
' GEN. CORP. L. of N. Y., art. II, § 5.
'Topken, Loring and Schwartz, Inc. v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E.
735 (1929) ; Norwalk v.-Marcus, 261 N. Y. 615, 185 N. E. 761 (1933).
' Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929) ; In re Fechheimer
Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735 (1929).
WHITNEY, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 19S4) § 49, "Mutuality of obligation means
that each party must be bound at least to some extent, they do not need to be
bound to the same or equal extent".
9 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 2 (b), "An apparent promise which according
to its terms makes performance optional with the promisor whatever may
happen, or whatever course of conduct in other respects he may pursue, is in
fact no promise, although often called an illusory promise."
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forth' 0 "A conditional promise- in which the promisor does not control the condition may be sufficient consideration for a counter-promise
and though the condition of the promise may never happen, and in
that event the promisor will not violate his promise if he does nothing, this alone will not prevent the promise from being sufficient consideration." 11 It is well established that an illusory promise constitutes insufficient consideration, 12 but not every conditional promise is
an illusory one. A conditional promise is not illusory unless the condition is within the arbitrary control of the promisor. 1 3 The validity
of a bilateral contract is neither affected by the condition that one of
the parties may terminate the contract upon the happening of contingencies, 14 nor is it affected by a promise, the performance of which
is entirely conditioned upon the happening of a future event.' 5
The Topken case attempted to classify the repurchase agreements
as illusory and void in their inception,-illusory because it is allegedly
within the sole discretion of the corporation (or of the directors as
representatives of the corporation) whether or not to perform. It
is inferred, therefore, that the corporation could distribute its surplus
before the purchase date to avoid such a contract. Where no surplus
exists, the corporation can not purchase. 16 In the instant case, 17 no
surplus existed at the purchase date. Before the decision in this case
the law, as to the validity of the contract, appears to have been settled
in Re Fechheinuer, Fishel Co.'8 "A corporation's contract to pur'

° RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 77 (b).
1 WiLLIsvor, CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1924) 215 (In regards sufficient con-

sideration in a bilateral contract, "Mutual promises in each of which the
promisor undertakes some act or forbearance that will be, or apparently may
be, detrimental to the promisor or beneficial to the promisee and neither of
which is rendered void by any rule of law, other than that relating to consideration, are sufficient consideration for one another").
" Cold Blast Transport Co. v. Kansas City Bolt Co., 114 Fed. 77 (C. C. A.
8th, 1902) ; Higbie v. Rust, 211 Ill. 333, 71 N. E. 1010 (1904) ; Burgess Fibre
Co. v. Broonefield, 180 Mass. 283, 62 N. E. 367 (1902) ; Gross v. Stampler, 165
N. Y. Supp. 214 (1st Dept. 1917); ANSON, CONTRACrS (Turck ed. 130) ("Although courts of law will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration, they
will insist that it should not be illusory, or unreal").
3 See Nassau Supply Co. v. Ice Service Co., 252 N. Y. 277, 169 N. E. 383
(1929), and cases cited in note 12, supra. It should be noted that these cases
as well as RESTATEMENT § 77b (see note 10, supra) demand that in an illusory
contract, the condition to performance of the promise must be wholly within
control
of the promisor.
"4 Keystone Steel and Wire Co. v. Pierce Oil Co., 17 F. (2d) 476 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1927); Wood and Co. v. Van Deursen, 122 Okla. 19, 250 Pac. 524
(1926).
' Beaumont Traction Co. v. Texarkana Ry., 103 Tex. 49, 123 S. W. 124
(1900) ; and see 1 WILLIsTON, CONTRACrS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 104, which holds
that the decisive factor in determining whether a promise is illusory is whether
the event upon which performance is conditioned is within the arbitrary control
of the romisor.
"6
PENAL LAW c. 40, § 664.
27 Topken, Loring and Schwartz v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735

(1929).
212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
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chase its own stock, though valid in its inception, can not be enforced
unless a surplus exists where payment is due."
Shortly following the Topken decision, the same court was confronted with Cross v. Beguelin.19 A corporation had contracted to
purchase a large block of its own stock from the plaintiff, out of its
then existing surplus. Before the installment payments had been
completed, the corporation became financially embarrassed and turned
its claims over to a creditors' committee. Plaintiff sued for specific
performance. In its opinion the court said: "When made, the agreement with Ferdinand Cross was valid" 20
* * Although plaintiff's
claim would not have been enforced against the corporation, since it
had no surplus, it is enforceable against the creditors' committee. The
case is in apparent conflict with the court's earlier decison in the
Topken case and places limitations thereon. The later decision no
longer classified the purchase agreements as illusory (which classification would of necessity void the contract) but held the agreement
valid in its inception.
If a contract be not binding, it can not
be the basis of a subsequent
21
valid claim, as it was in the Cross case.
The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law 22 empowers a corporation "To purchase, take, receive or otherwise acquire, its own
stock * * * except that no such purchase or acquisition shall be made
at a time where the net assets of the corporation are less than its stated
capital, or which would reduce its net assets below its stated capital." 23
In a case 24 under the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law-a
corporation entered into an agreement with an employee for the sale
to him of 100 shares at par. It was mutually agreed that upon termination of his employment--or within 30 days thereafter-the corporation would repurchase at par. The agreement was sustained as
valid-the court apparently deciding that the contract was not illusory
and was not lacking in mutuality of obligation-and, as a surplus existed on the repurchase date, the corporation was
compelled to pay
par value plus certain accretions and dividends. 25
19252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
252 N. Y. 262, 265, 169 N. E. 378, 379 (1929).
See (1930) 43 HARV. L. REv. 830, "The court in the instant case (Cross
v. Beguelin) did not mention the Topken case in this regard nor did it base
recovery on principles of quasi-contract. This would seem to indicate that the
earlier decision has been pared down to a holding that equity will not grant the
corporation specific performance against a stockholder who has received nothing
but a promise which he may not be able to enforce."

(Italics ours.)

III, § 302, subd. 7.
Compare this with the N. Y. PENAL LAW c. 40, § 664. Both statutes
have the effect of limiting the repurchase of a corporation's own stock to
instances where a surplus exists.
" Revloc Supply Co. v. Troxell, 281 Pa. 424, 126 Atl. 774 (1924).
' It is well to bear in mind that this decision was reached in a state having
a statute (see note 21, supra) similar to the one governing in New York (see
'Art.

note 11, supra).
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The principal New York cases here discussed 26 are in accord
that "The assets of a corporation constitute a trust fund for the benefit
of the creditors", consequently a purchase of corporate stock out of
capital is said to be illegal because in violation of the rights of corporate creditors.2 7 The Penal Law constitutes the bar to such transactions, but the creditors have no right to complain so long as the
capital is kept intact.28 Undoubtedly the result reached in the Topken
case is a fair and just one-for had the court decreed specific performance-the defendant, employee, would have received nothing in
return for his shares. (The shares had no book value.) But the deductions and methods used to reach that decision are causing unnecessary confusion and bar a desirable type of contract between corporation and employee. 29 The case is open to criticism on two grounds:
1. It was dicta to declare the contract illusory and lacking in
mutuality.
2. The contract was not illusory.
(1) As was previously noted, the Penal Law permits the repurchase of stock out of surplus, and contracts to so repurchase are
valid.30 As no surplus existed on the repurchase date, the court
should have decided the case on that issue and avoided the contract
as of that date-as other courts have done under similar circumstances. 31 Assuming that the contract had stated, as a condition, that
it be unenforceable if no surplus existed on the repurchase date, the
result would not be changed. The condition would merely be stating
that which the Penal Statute injects into
all such contracts-and an
32
illegal intent will not here be presumed.
(2) The court's premise was that the contract was illusorythat it left to the discretion of the corporation whether or not to per" Topken, Loring and Schwartz v. Schwarlz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735
(1929); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929).
See Note (1913) 13 CoL. L. REv. 148.
See Note (1914) 14 COL. L. REv. 451, "Creditors have no right to complain so long as the capital on which they are presumed to rely is kept intact."
In discussing Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) the
note stated, "Since the purchase did not encroach upon the capital at the time
it was made, it would seem that a valid debt was created." (Italics ours.)
The majority rule through the forty-eight states is that a corporation may
purchase its own stock if "in good faith and without intent to injure creditors."
See CURRENT DIGEST, CoRPoRATIoNs § 376, and cases cited in note 2, srtpra.
I Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 278 (1929); Richards v.
Weiner, 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912) ; It re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212
Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
'See note 21, supra; and see (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 356, "Although in
holding the contract not specifically enforcible it was unnecessary for the court
to decide that no action could be maintained at law." (Italics ours.)
' "On the contrary everything must be presumed, to be legal until the
contrary is proved", 118 App. Div. 490, 103 N. Y. Supp. 607 (3d Dept. 1907).
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form. 3 3 (The decisive factor in determining whether a promise is il-

lusory, is whether the event upon which performance is conditioned
is within the arbitrary control of the promisor.) 3 4 Was performance
discretionary? Was performance so within the control of the directors as to render their promise illusory ? 35 We are not to infer any
illegal intent to the directors.3 6 There are also extra-promissory limitations on the promise (such as the economic impracticality of distributing surplus to avoid such a contract), which would seem adequate to prevent the promise from being illusory. Nor is the contract illusory under the definition set forth by the restatement 3 7 for
the factor of arbitrary control is absent. To repeat, the control of
surplus by the directors is not so arbitraryas to render the promise
illusory: because of the economic impracticality and because there is
no legal justification to assume that the directors will intentionally
breach their contract. It would seem that at the most, the repurchase
dateagreement is voidable if no surplus exists at the repurchase
38
the existence of surplus being the condition to performance.
EUGENE 0. COBERT.

' The basis of the decision was that "one of the promises might or might
not be good, the same as if a discretion were left to one of the parties to

perform or not to perform", p. 211.

1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 104; and see note 10, mipra.
This question naturally follows-as the only method by which the corpo-

ration could avoid its contract was to distribute its surplus so that none remained
at repurchase date.
I Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N. E. 521 (1929)
(Case also held, p. 205, "Directors must manage corporate affairs above their
personal concerns with reasonable intelligence, as they occupy a fiduciary relation * * *").
' See notes 10, 11, supra.
'See Richards v. Weiner, 207 N. Y. 59, 100 N. E. 592 (1912) to the effect
that where a corporation has failed to fulfill a contract to repurchase shares,
the burden is upon the corporation of showing that no surplus existed out of
which the purchase could be made. It is well to bear in mind at this point,
that Pennsylvania, having a similar statute (see notes 22 and 23, supra) in a
case somewhat similar to the Topken case (see Revioc case discussed in article)
has held the contract enforceable and granted specific performance.

